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Abstract
In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of
the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incen-
tive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by
posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that
is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition
on meeting technologies, which we call “invariance,” and show that the transfer is equal to
zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition.
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1 Introduction
What trading mechanism should a seller use to sell a good? This is a classic question in economics
and the answer, of course, depends on the details of the environment. We study this question in
an environment with three key ingredients. First, there are a large number of sellers and a large
number of buyers, each seller has one indivisible good, and sellers compete for buyers by posting
the trading mechanism they will use to sell their good. Then, buyers observe the mechanisms that
have been posted and choose the one that promises the maximal expected payoff, but the process
by which buyers and sellers meet is frictional. In particular, when a buyer chooses to visit a seller,
there may be uncertainty about whether he is actually able to meet with that seller, as well as the
number of other buyers who also meet with that seller; we call the function that governs this process
the “meeting technology.” Finally, after buyers meet with a seller, they learn their idiosyncratic
private valuation for the seller’s good.
In this environment, we provide a complete characterization of the mechanism that sellers
choose in equilibrium. More specifically, we show that sellers can do no better than a second-price
auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation and a fee (or subsidy) that is paid by (or
to) each buyer that participates. We characterize this fee in closed form. Then, in the same spirit
as Eeckhout & Kircher (2010), we study how this optimal mechanism depends on the properties
of the meeting technology.
Our results suggest that conclusions drawn in the existing literature may depend quite heavily
on the specific functional form that has typically been chosen for the meeting technology. In par-
ticular, previous studies of this basic environment (e.g., Peters (1997), Peters & Severinov (1997),
Albrecht et al. (2012, 2013, 2014) and Kim & Kircher (2013)) have shared three features in com-
mon. First, the equilibrium in these papers is constrained efficient, in the sense that the solution to
the planner’s problem is implemented. Second, the trading mechanism that implements the con-
strained efficient allocation only requires transfers between the two agents that ultimately trade, so
that agents who do not trade are not required to pay a fee nor are they offered a subsidy. Last, all
of the papers cited above assume the same functional form for the meeting technology—what is
often called the “urn-ball” meeting technology.
Taken together, the first two properties are somewhat surprising. After all, constrained effi-
ciency places strict requirements on two distinct margins. First, from an ex ante point of view,
it requires the proper allocation of buyers to sellers. Second, from an ex post point of view, it
requires the proper allocation of the good once buyers arrive at a seller and learn their valuations.
In order to implement an equilibrium that satisfies these two requirements, the payoffs received
by buyers and sellers must inherit certain properties: to satisfy the first requirement, each buyer
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must receive an expected payoff exactly equal to his marginal contribution to the match surplus;1
however, to satisfy the second requirement, payoffs must ensure that buyers truthfully report their
valuation and that the good is allocated to the agent with the highest valuation. In principle, there
is no reason to think that the payoffs satisfying the former requirement should coincide with the
payoffs satisfying the latter.
We show that, in fact, these payoffs coincide—or, equivalently, that the meeting fee in the opti-
mal mechanism is equal to zero—if, and only if, the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition
that we call invariance. Loosely speaking, a meeting technology is invariant if the decision by one
buyer to visit the mechanism a seller has posted does not interfere with the process by which that
seller meets with other buyers. When invariance is violated, one buyer’s search decision exerts an
externality on the meeting prospects of the seller with other buyers, and this externality needs to
be taxed (or subsidized).
The urn-ball process is one example of a meeting technology that satisfies invariance, which
explains why the optimal mechanism in previous studies was so simple and why additional (rarely
observed) side payments were not necessary. However, the urn-ball meeting technology also sat-
isfies several other properties that previous studies have conjectured are important for determining
the optimal trading mechanism. We close our analysis by comparing one of these properties—
what Eeckhout & Kircher (2010) call “non-rivalry”—with our invariance property. We show that
non-rivalry is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for invariance.
2 Environment
Agents and Preferences. The economy is populated by a measure µB > 0 of buyers and a
measure µS > 0 of sellers, with Λ = µBµS .
2 Each seller possesses one, indivisible good and each
buyer has unit demand for this good. All agents are risk neutral.
Sellers value their own good at y, which is common knowledge, while buyers have to visit
a seller in order to learn their valuation. In particular, after a buyer meets a seller, he learns his
private valuation x for that seller’s good, which is drawn from a twice continuously-differentiable
distribution F (x) with support [x, x] ⊂ R+. An individual buyer’s valuations are i.i.d. across
sellers, as are the valuations of each buyer at an individual seller. We assume that y ∈ [x, x).3
1For detailed discussions of the relationship between the division of surplus and efficiency in search environments,
see, e.g., Mortensen (1982), Hosios (1990) and Moen (1997).
2Though we focus our attention on an environment with an exogenous measure of sellers, our results do not change
if we endogenize the measure of sellers through a free entry condition. We prove this formally in the Appendix.
3Since we do not impose much structure on F (x), this is a fairly weak assumption, as the probability that a buyer’s
valuation x is smaller than y can be driven to zero without any loss of generality.
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Mechanisms. In order to attract buyers, each seller posts and commits to a direct mechanism.
A mechanism specifies an extensive form game that determines for each buyer i a probability of
trade and an expected payment as a function of: (i) the total number n of buyers to meet with the
seller; (ii) the valuation xi that buyer i reports; and (iii) the valuations x−i reported by the n − 1
other buyers. Formally, a mechanism is summarized by a probability of trade φ(xi, x−i, n) and a
transfer τ(xi, x−i, n) for all n ∈ N1 ≡ {1, 2, 3, . . .} and i ∈ {1, 2, ...n}.
Meeting Technology. After observing all posted mechanisms, each buyer chooses the mecha-
nism at which he will attempt to trade. However, the meeting process between buyers and sellers
is frictional, so that some buyers may not meet a seller and some sellers may not meet with any
buyers.4 As is often done in the literature, we restrict attention to meeting technologies that ex-
hibit constant returns to scale. More specifically, suppose a measure σ of sellers post the same
mechanism and a measure β of buyers choose this mechanism. Then, letting λ = β/σ denote the
market tightness or queue length at that mechanism, a seller meets exactly n ∈ N0 ≡ {0, 1, 2, . . .}
buyers with probability Pn (λ).5 We assume that Pn (λ) is twice continuously-differentiable. Since
the number of meetings cannot exceed the number of buyers who attempt to trade at a particular
mechanism, the probability distribution must satisfy
∑∞
n=0 nPn (λ) ≤ λ.
We denote the probability for a buyer to meet a seller with exactly n−1 other buyers byQn (λ).
This probability is related to Pn (λ) through the consistency requirement
nPn (λ) = λQn (λ) , (1)
for all n ∈ N1. Intuitively, given market tightness λ = β/σ at some mechanism, the measure of
buyers at those sellers who end up with precisely n buyers, σnPn(λ), must equal the measure of
buyers who face n−1 buyers at their seller, βQn(λ). Finally, we defineQ0 (λ) = 1−
∑∞
n=1 Qn (λ)
as the probability that the buyer fails to meet with a seller.
Probability-Generating Function. It will prove useful to define the function
m (z;λ) ≡ E [zn|λ] =
∞∑
n=0
Pn (λ) z
n (2)
4Note that our language follows that of Eeckhout & Kircher (2010), who make the distinction between meetings
and matches. All buyers who participate in a seller’s trading mechanism are said to “meet” with the seller, whereas
the buyer who acquires the seller’s single, indivisible good is said to “match” with the seller.
5We follow most of the literature by assuming that the process through which buyers and sellers meet is exogenous.
Only a small number of papers derive the meeting technology as the endogenous outcome of agents’ optimal decisions.
See Lester et al. (2013) for an example.
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for z ∈ [0, 1] with, by convention, m (0;λ) = P0 (λ). This function is the probability-generating
function of n and provides an alternative representation of Pn (λ), as Pn (λ) = 1n!
∂n
∂zn
m (0;λ) . As
we will see below, introducing the notation and tools of probability-generating functions allows
us to derive a number of results that would be more difficult to obtain using standard techniques
from the directed search literature. In particular, it will be helpful to note that, setting z = F (x),
m (z;λ) can be interpreted as the probability that the maximum valuation at a seller with a queue
length λ is no greater than x.6
Let mz and mλ denote the partial derivative of m (z;λ) with respect to the first and second
argument, respectively. Given the properties of a probability-generating function, the expected
number of meetings per unit mass of sellers can then be expressed as
∞∑
n=0
nPn (λ) = mz (1;λ) . (3)
Note that mz (·) > 0, with m (·) ranging from m (0;λ) = P0 (λ) to m (1;λ) = 1. In addition, we
impose that mλ (z;λ) < 0 and mλλ (z;λ) ≡ ∂2∂λ2m (z;λ) > 0 for all z ∈ [0, 1) and λ ∈ (0,∞).
Again letting z = F (x), these assumptions imply that a marginal increase in the queue length
always reduces the probability that the maximum valuation at a seller is below x = F−1(z), but
that the effect is smaller when the queue length is longer.7
3 The Planner’s Problem and Market Equilibrium
In this section, we first characterize the solution to the planner’s problem, and then characterize
the decentralized market equilibrium.
3.1 The Planner’s Problem
Consider the problem of a benevolent social planner whose objective is to maximize net social
surplus, subject to the frictions of the physical environment (e.g., the meeting frictions). The
planner’s decision rule can be broken down into two components. First, the planner has to assign
queue lengths to each seller, subject to the constraint that the sum of these queue lengths across
all sellers cannot exceed the total measure of available buyers. Second, the planner has to specify
a trading rule for agents to follow after buyers arrive at sellers. We solve these stages in reverse
order. As the derivation is standard for each component, we keep the exposition brief.
6If no buyers arrive, the maximum valuation is, by convention, −∞.
7Monotonicity of m (·) in λ is implied if a change in λ causes a first-order stochastic dominance shift in Pn (λ).
Convexity is also common in the literature; see, e.g., Eeckhout & Kircher (2010) for a similar assumption.
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Trading Rule. Consider a seller who is visited by n buyers. Clearly, the surplus at this seller is
maximized by instructing the seller to trade with the buyer who has the highest valuation x if this
valuation exceeds y, and keep the good himself otherwise. Therefore, the expected net surplus at a
seller with queue length λ is
S (λ) =
∞∑
n=0
Pn (λ)
∫ x
y
(x− y) dF n (x) = x− y −
∫ x
y
m (F (x) ;λ) dx. (4)
Allocation of Buyers. Now consider the allocation of buyers to sellers. At this stage, the objec-
tive of the planner is to choose queue lengths at each seller, i.e., λj for j ∈ [0, µS], to maximize∫ µS
0
S (λj) dj subject to the constraint that
∫ µS
0
λjdj = µB. As S ′′ (λ) = −mλλ (F (x) ;λ) < 0,
it follows immediately that the planner maximizes total surplus by assigning equal queue lengths
across all sellers, so that λj = Λ = µBµS for all j and total surplus equals
∫ µS
0
S (Λ) dj = µSS (Λ) .
The following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 1. A unique solution to the planner’s problem exists. In this solution, each seller is
assigned a queue length Λ. After buyers arrive and learn their valuation, the planner assigns the
good to the agent with the highest valuation.
3.2 Market Equilibrium
To characterize the relevant properties of the mechanism that sellers select in equilibrium, we
proceed in two steps. First, we restrict attention to second-price auctions with a reserve price r and
a meeting fee t that is paid by (or to) each buyer before learning his type. Within this restricted set
of mechanisms, we define an equilibrium and characterize the profit-maximizing values of r and
t. Then, we establish that sellers can do no better than this second-price auction, even with access
to the set of all direct mechanisms. More specifically, we show that any direct mechanism chosen
by a seller in equilibrium will be payoff-equivalent to the second-price auction with r and t chosen
optimally.
Equilibrium with Second-Price Auctions and Meeting Fees. As a first step, we calculate the
expected revenue of a seller who sets r and t and attracts a queue length λ, along with the expected
payoff of each buyer that visits this seller.
Lemma 1. A seller who posts a second-price auction with reserve price r and meeting fee t who
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attracts a queue λ obtains an expected payoff equal to
R (r, t, λ) = x− (r − y)m (F (r) ;λ)−
∫ x
r
m (F (x) ;λ) dx
−
∫ x
r
(1− F (x))mz (F (x) ;λ) dx+ tmz (1;λ) .
The expected payoff for each buyer in the seller’s queue equals
U (r, t, λ) =
1
λ
∫ x
r
(1− F (x))mz (F (x) ;λ) dx− t
λ
mz (1;λ) . (5)
A seller’s objective is to maximize revenue, taking into account that his choice of r and t
affects the queue λ that he attracts. In particular, optimal search behavior implies that buyers must
be indifferent between all sellers who receive a strictly positive queue. Formally, let U denote the
highest level of utility that buyers can obtain in this market, or what is often called the “market
utility.” Then, the equilibrium relationship between r, t, and λ is determined by U (r, t, λ) = U .
Hence, an equilibrium in this environment is formally a distributionG (r, t, λ) of reserve prices,
meeting fees, and queue lengths across sellers, and a market utility U , such that (i) given U ,
each triple (r, t, λ) in the support of G maximizes revenue R (r, t, λ) subject to the constraint
U (r, t, λ) = U ; and (ii) aggregating queue lengths across all sellers yields the total measure of
buyers, µB. However, one can prove that there exists a unique equilibrium in which all sellers post
the same reserve price r∗ and meeting fee t∗, and attract the same queue λ∗ = Λ. Moreover, it
turns out that the optimal reserve price is equal to the sellers’ valuation (r∗ = y), so that the good
is allocated to the agent (one of the buyers or the seller) with the highest valuation. Hence, the
decentralized equilibrium is constrained efficient, i.e., it creates the same amount of surplus as the
planner’s solution. The following proposition summarizes and derives t∗ in closed form.
Proposition 2. A unique equilibrium exists and it is constrained efficient. In equilibrium, the
reservation price equals r∗ = y, the meeting fee equals
t∗ =
Λ
mz (1; Λ)
∫ x
y
[
1
Λ
(1− F (x))mz (F (x) ; Λ) +mλ (F (x) ; Λ)
]
dx, (6)
and the queue length equals λ∗ = Λ at all sellers, with buyers receiving market utility U =
U(r∗, t∗,Λ).
Intuitively, the first term in brackets in (6) is the buyer’s private expected payoff from partici-
pating in an auction with reserve price r = y when the queue length is Λ, which is evident from
(5). The second term in brackets is the (negative value of) this buyer’s marginal contribution to
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the social surplus generated by the auction, which is evident from (4). Hence, t∗ is simply the
difference between the two, adjusted to account for the fact that not every buyer actually meets the
seller and pays this fee.
Equilibrium with General Mechanisms. Proposition 2 describes the equilibrium outcome when
sellers have access to a restricted set of mechanisms and shows that the equilibrium coincides with
the solution to the planner’s problem. In Proposition 3 below, we establish that sellers would not
benefit from having access to a larger set of mechanisms; both the expected payoffs and the alloca-
tions will be identical in any other equilibrium. The reasoning is simple: since buyers’ equilibrium
payoffs are equal to the market utility U , an individual seller is the residual claimant on any ad-
ditional surplus he creates. Hence, he has incentive to select an efficient mechanism in order to
maximize this surplus. The mechanism that we consider—a second-price auction with a reserve
price r and a meeting fee t—is sufficiently flexible that it allows the seller to maximize the “size
of the pie” without placing restrictions on how the pie is divided. Therefore, access to additional
mechanisms is largely irrelevant.8
Proposition 3. A mechanism {φ(xi, x−i, n), τ(xi, x−i, n)} is an equilibrium if, and only if, it is
payoff-equivalent to the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2.
4 Meeting Technologies and the Optimal Mechanism
In the previous section, we characterized the equilibrium mechanism that arises in a fairly general
environment. An important feature of the optimal mechanism is a meeting fee, t∗, that allows
sellers to manipulate expected revenue without distorting the efficient allocation. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, this meeting fee does not play a role in the optimal mechanism that has been identified in
the previous literature. Rather, these papers find that the optimal mechanism is simply an auction
with reserve price r∗ = y.
We now reconcile our results with the existing literature by showing that previous studies had
focused on a special class of meeting functions. In particular, we introduce a novel property of
meeting technologies that we call invariance and show that this property is necessary and suffi-
cient for t∗ = 0. We use several examples to illustrate the relationship between invariance and the
necessity of meeting fees. We then conclude by reviewing another property of meeting technolo-
gies that has been identified in the literature and discuss its relationship to invariance.
8One may also wonder whether there exists an alternative equilibrium in which sellers use a mechanism that only
requires the buyer who trades to pay a transfer, and leaves all other buyers with a payoff of zero. In the Appendix, we
show that the answer is “no.”
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4.1 Invariance
We now introduce a property of meeting technologies that we call “invariance,” which requires
that the probability of a seller meeting with n members of any subset of buyers in the queue is
unaffected by the presence (or lack thereof) of buyers in the queue who are outside of this subset,
for all n ∈ N0. To formalize this concept, suppose that each buyer is assigned a certain label with
probability γ ∈ [0, 1], independent of the realizations of this label for other buyers. Then, the
probability that a seller meets exactly n buyers with this label equals9
P˜n (λ, γ) ≡
∞∑
N=n
PN (λ)
(
N
n
)
γn (1− γ)N−n .
Definition 1. A meeting technology is invariant if, and only if, P˜n (λ, γ) = Pn (γλ) for all γ ∈
(0, 1), λ ∈ (0,∞), and all n ∈ N0.
To understand the intuition, consider a sub-market in which the ratio of buyers to sellers is λ,
and suppose that a fraction γ of buyers are red and the remainder are green.10 Invariance, then, says
that the ratio of red buyers to sellers must be a sufficient statistic for the distribution that governs
the number of red buyers who arrive at a seller. In particular, changing the measure of green buyers
should not change the probability that n red buyers arrive at a seller, for any n ∈ N0.
In other words, a marginal buyer choosing to visit the mechanism a seller has posted does
not interfere with the process by which that seller meets with other buyers. When the invariance
condition is violated, the seller either wants to tax or subsidize buyers for choosing his mechanism,
depending on whether they exert a negative or positive externality on his prospects for meeting
other buyers, respectively. The proposition below formalizes this argument: we establish that
meeting fees are set to zero in equilibrium if, and only if, the meeting technology is invariant, and
we derive a simple condition for verifying invariance for arbitrary technologies.
Proposition 4. Consider a meeting technology Pn (λ). The following statements are equivalent:
1. Meeting fees are not used in equilibrium, i.e., t∗ = 0 for any distribution F (x) with support
[x, x] ⊂ [0,∞), y ∈ [x, x) and Λ ∈ (0,∞);
2. The meeting technology is invariant;
9This transformation, introduced by Re´nyi (1956), is known as “binomial thinning.” See Harremoe¨s et al. (2010).
10Note that labeling buyers “red” and “green” is simply a convenient device to split the queue into subsets. Indeed,
different labels can be arbitrarily assigned to ex ante homogeneous buyers, which will be the case in our analysis, or
they can be assigned to buyers that are ex ante heterogeneous, as we discuss in Section 4.2. For the purpose of defining
invariance, it does not matter. It does, however, slightly change the intuition in some of our explanations below. In
what follows, we find it easiest to convey the intuition by treating a buyer’s color as being realized ex ante, but the
discussion could easily be adapted to treat the alternative case as well.
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3. The meeting technology can be written as
Pn (λ) =
(−λ)nM (n) (λ)
n!
, (7)
for some function M : [0,∞) → [0, 1] that satisfies m (z;λ) = M (λ (1− z)) and pre-
serves all of our assumptions on Pn (λ) and m (z;λ), with M (n) (·) denoting the nth-order
derivative of M .11
4.2 Discussion
Examples of Meeting Technologies. In order to facilitate a discussion of the invariance condi-
tion introduced above, it will be helpful to introduce a few examples of meeting technologies.
1. Urn-Ball. Popular in the directed search literature, this specification arises when a measure
β of buyers randomize evenly across a measure σ of sellers who have posted the same mech-
anism.12 As a result, the number of buyers that visit a particular seller is determined by a
Poisson distribution with mean equal to λ = β/σ. That is, Pn (λ) = e−λ λ
n
n!
.
2. Geometric. The geometric meeting technology specifies that Pn(λ) = λ
n
(1+λ)n+1
. Again,
letting λ = β/σ, this meeting technology can be interpreted as the outcome of a process in
which a mass β of buyers and a mass σ of sellers are randomly positioned on a circle, and
buyers walk to the nearest seller to their right.
3. Bilateral. This specification, often used in the literature that uses search-theoretic models
to study monetary theory, has the following interpretation.13 Suppose there is a mass β and
σ of buyers and sellers, respectively, and all agents are randomly matched in pairs. Then,
given λ = β/σ, the probability distribution over the number of buyers that a seller meets is:
P0 (λ) =
1
1+λ
, P1 (λ) = λ1+λ , and Pn (λ) = 0 for n ∈ {2, 3, . . .}.
4. Pairwise Urn-Ball. If a measure β of buyers are first grouped in pairs and then allocated
across a measure σ of sellers according to the urn-ball technology described above then, let-
ting λ = β/σ, the meeting technology can be described by Pn (λ) = 0 for n ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . .}
and Pn (λ) = e−λ/2
(λ/2)n/2
(n/2)!
for n ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .}.
There are several things to note from these examples. First, the urn-ball technology satisfies the
invariance condition: when all buyers randomize across a group of sellers, the presence of more
11For the sake of completeness, we describe exactly which properties of M are necessary to preserve our assump-
tions on Pn and m in the Appendix.
12This specification was first used by Butters (1977) and Hall (1977). See Burdett et al. (2001) for an explicit
derivation of the micro-foundations of this meeting technology in a directed search model.
13See, e.g., Kiyotaki & Wright (1993) and Trejos & Wright (1995). This technology has also been used more
recently to study trading dynamics in over-the-counter financial markets; see, e.g., Duffie et al. (2007).
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green buyers has no effect on the number of red buyers to arrive at a particular seller. Since the
existing literature has focused primarily on the case of urn-ball matching, it should then come as no
surprise that a simple second-price auction with r∗ = y was identified as the optimal mechanism.
Second, since the geometric technology satisfies (7) for M (λ) = 1
1+λ
, this meeting technology
also satisfies invariance: since a red buyer meets with the first seller to his right, it is irrelevant
(by construction) how many green buyers he passes on his way.14 This confirms that the set of
invariant meeting technologies is not limited to derivatives of the urn-ball process, but accepts
other reasonable meeting processes as well.
Third, note that the bilateral meeting technology is not invariant: since sellers only meet with
one randomly selected buyer under this meeting technology, an increase in the measure of green
buyers will decrease the probability that a seller meets one red buyer (and increase the probability
he meets zero red buyers). Hence, in a competitive environment with this meeting technology,
sellers would optimally employ a meeting fee to tax this congestion externality appropriately.
Lastly, note that the pairwise urn-ball technology also violates invariance. Intuitively, when
the measure of green buyers is insignificant, most red buyers are matched in pairs with other red
buyers and it is highly likely that a seller is visited by an even number of red buyers. As the
measure of green buyers gets large, however, it becomes increasingly likely that red buyers are
paired with green buyers, which implies a greater probability that a seller is visited by an odd
number of red buyers. Hence, this process is not invariant. However, in contrast to the bilateral
meeting technology, buyers exert a positive externality on one another under the pairwise urn-ball
meeting process, and thus sellers optimally offer a meeting subsidy in equilibrium (i.e., t∗ < 0).
Non-Rivalry. We close our analysis by comparing the invariance condition to another property
of meeting technologies that has been identified in the literature: what has often been called “non-
rivalry.” In addition to distinguishing our results from the existing literature, this comparison also
sheds light on other environments in which the invariance condition is likely to be an important
determinant of the optimal mechanism for price (or wage) determination.
In words, Eeckhout & Kircher (2010) describe a (purely) non-rival meeting technology as one
in which “the meeting probability for a buyer is not affected by the presence of other buyers in the
market.”15 That is, 1 − Q0 (λ) is independent of λ. Using the definition of Q0 (λ), it is easy to
verify that this condition is equivalent to the requirement that there exists a γ ∈ [0, 1], such that∑∞
n=0 nPn (λ) = γλ for all λ.
16
14More generally, the family of negative-binomial distributions satisfies equation (7) for M (λ) =
(
θ
θ+λ
)θ
and
θ ∈ N1. This family of distributions is therefore invariant as well.
15For a recent example of a paper that cites the importance of non-rivalry, see Albrecht et al. (2014).
16Note that
∑∞
n=1Qn (λ) =
1
λ
∑∞
n=0 nPn (λ).
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Clearly the urn-ball technology described earlier in the text is non-rival because each buyer
meets a seller with probability one. The bilateral meeting technology, however, violates non-
rivalry. Since each seller can meet at most one buyer, an increase in the ratio of buyers to sellers
implies that each buyer is more likely to be crowded out. As a result, the probability that each
buyer meets a seller, 1 − Q0 (λ) = 1−e−λλ , is decreasing in λ. Given these observations, a natural
question is how non-rivalry relates to invariance, which we address in the following lemma.17
Lemma 2. Invariance implies non-rivalry, but non-rivalry does not imply invariance.
To understand the first statement in Lemma 2, it is helpful to recall our previous example,
where buyers are either red or green. If the meeting technology does not satisfy non-rivalry, then
increasing the measure of green buyers, while holding constant the measure of sellers and red
buyers, will decrease the probability that each red buyer meets a seller. This implies that increasing
the measure of green buyers will decrease the probability that a seller meets with n ≥ 1 red
buyers, which violates the invariance condition. The second statement in the lemma follows from
considering the pairwise urn-ball technology. This technology is non-rival since each buyer meets
a seller with probability one, regardless of the ratio of buyers to sellers. However, as we explained
above, it is not invariant.
Intuitively, non-rivalry is a statement about whether a buyer’s decision to visit a sub-market (or
mechanism) affects the probability that another buyer will meet a seller in that sub-market, while
invariance is a statement about whether an individual buyer’s decision to visit a sub-market affects
the distribution of buyers at each seller in that sub-market. Given this distinction, we conclude
that whether or not a meeting technology is invariant is likely to be a crucial determinant of the
optimal trading mechanism in any environment where the payoff of a seller (or firm) depends on
the distribution of buyers (or workers) that arrive. In this paper, we provided perhaps the simplest
environment where the distribution of buyers is relevant: when buyers draw independent valuations
after choosing a seller, a key object of interest for the seller is the maximum valuation among all
buyers—an order statistic—which clearly depends on whether there are two or three or four buyers.
However, by this logic, invariance is also likely to be an important property of the meeting
technology in models of directed search in which buyers can attempt to meet multiple sellers, as
in Albrecht et al. (2006) and Galenianos & Kircher (2009). In these models, ex post heterogeneity
arises because some buyers have received two price quotes and others have received only one; a
seller’s trading probability is thus 1 − P˜0 (λ, γ), where γ is the fraction of buyers that don’t trade
with a different seller. As such, our results suggest that meeting fees will likely be needed to price
17In the Appendix, we compare invariance to a third property of meeting technologies that the urn-ball technology
also satisfies, which we call “independence.” Put succinctly, this property requires that the arrival of a buyer at a
particular seller does not change the distribution of other buyers at that seller. We show that independence is neither
sufficient nor neccessary for invariance.
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this externality if the meeting technology is not invariant.18
Importantly, the role of the invariance condition in determining the optimal trading mechanism
is not limited to environments with ex post heterogeneity, but is also likely to be important in
environments with ex ante heterogeneity as well. For example, in a directed search model with ex
ante heterogeneous buyers, if invariance is violated—e.g., if one buyer’s search decision affects the
distribution of other buyers that the seller meets—then our results suggest that standard methods
of price determination may need to be supplemented with fees or subsidies.19 We leave a detailed
investigation of the role of invariance in models with ex ante heterogeneity for future research.
5 Conclusion
We consider an environment in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms and buyers direct
their search toward the mechanism offering the maximal expected payoff. We characterize the
trading mechanism that sellers choose in equilibrium, given a fairly general class of meeting tech-
nologies. We show that, in general, sellers can do no better than posting an auction with no reserve
price, but with a meeting fee (or subsidy) that is paid by (or to) all buyers who participate in the
auction. Then, we completely characterize a subset of meeting technologies for which the meet-
ing fee is set to zero, and show that the meeting technology that previous studies have used was
contained in this subset. We call the meeting technologies in this subset invariant.
Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of this result is provided in the main text.
18This is consistent with the results in this literature that wage posting (without meeting fees) decentralizes the
planner’s solution when the meeting technology is urn-ball (Kircher, 2009), but not when firms are constrained in the
number of applications that they can process (Galenianos & Kircher, 2009; Wolthoff, 2012).
19Indeed, with ex ante heterogeneity, the meeting technology affects both the optimal mechanism and whether
different types of buyers pool or separate in equilibrium: an urn-ball technology leads to perfect pooling, while a
bilateral technology leads to perfect separation. Peters & Severinov (1997), Vira´g (2010), Albrecht et al. (2012,
2014) and Peters (2013) study the urn-ball case, while Eeckhout & Kircher (2010) analyze both urn-ball and bilateral
meeting technologies. Shi (2001) derives related results in a labor market setting with bilateral meetings, while Shimer
(2005) and Peters (2010) study a similar problem with the urn-ball meeting technology. Given our results, a natural
conjecture is that the pooling equilibrium without meeting fees extends to all invariant meeting technologies, while
meeting technologies with congestion externalities give rise to an equilibrium with meeting fees and at least some
separation of types.
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Proof of Lemma 1. From the description of the auction in the main text, it follows immediately
that a buyer’s expected payoff equals
U (r, t, λ) =
∞∑
n=1
Qn (λ)
[∫ x
r
∫ x
x
(x−max {x˜, r}) dF n−1 (x˜) dF (x)− t
]
.
The inner integral simplifies to
∫ x
r
F n−1 (x˜) dx˜ after integration by parts. Changing the order of
integration and substituting equations (1) and (2) then yields equation (5).
To calculate the payoff of a seller, consider the expected valuation V (r, λ) of the agent that
holds the good at the end of the period, given a queue length λ and reserve price r. As the maximum
valuation among n buyers is distributed according to F n (x), V (r, λ) equals
V (r, λ) = P0 (λ) y +
∞∑
n=1
Pn (λ)
[
F n (r) y +
∫ x
r
xdF n (x)
]
= x− (r − y)m (F (r) ;λ)−
∫ x
r
m (F (x) ;λ) dx,
where the second line follows after integration by parts and substitution of (2). As the payoff of a
seller must satisfy R (r, t, λ) = V (r, λ)− λU (r, t, λ), the desired expression follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. The Lagrangian of the seller’s maximization problem equals
L (r, t, λ, ζ) = R (r, t, λ) + ζ
(
U (r, t, λ)− U) ,
where ζ denotes the multiplier on the market utility constraint. The first-order condition with
respect to t equals (
1− ζ
∗
λ∗
)
mz (1;λ
∗) = 0.
As mz (1;λ) > 0, this implies that ζ∗ = λ∗ in any equilibrium. Substituting this into the first-
order condition with respect to r gives (y − r∗)mz (F (r∗) ;λ∗)F ′ (r∗) = 0. Hence, r∗ = y in
any equilibrium. In combination with these results, the first-order condition with respect to λ
subsequently implies that the optimal meeting fee must satisfy
t∗ =
λ∗
mz (1;λ∗)
∫ x
y
[
1
λ∗
(1− F (x))mz (F (x) ;λ∗) +mλ (F (x) ;λ∗)
]
dx.
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In combination with the first-order condition with respect to ζ , this implies that the optimal queue
length λ∗ is determined by
−
∫ x
y
mλ (F (x) ;λ
∗) dx = U. (8)
Since m (z;λ) is convex in λ, a unique solution exists for any U small enough. In equilibrium, the
market utility has to be such that λ∗ = Λ, or otherwise the market clearing constraint
∫ µS
0
λ∗dj =
µB is violated. It immediately follows that U = −
∫ x
y
mλ (F (x) ; Λ) dx and that the equilibrium is
efficient.
Proof of Proposition 3. This proof closely resembles the corresponding one in Lester et al.
(2013) and suppresses the arguments of φ and τ to keep notation concise. Suppose there exists
an equilibrium in which one or more sellers post a particular mechanism {φ0, τ0} and attract a
queue length λ0, which yields them a payoff R (φ0, τ0, λ0), yields buyers a market utility U =
U (φ0, τ0, λ0), and creates a surplus S (φ0, λ0) = R (φ0, τ0, λ0)+λ0U (φ0, τ0, λ0)−y.20 A deviant
seller who posts a mechanism {φ, τ} and attracts a queue λ, determined by the market utility
conditionU (φ, τ, λ) = U , obtains a payoff
R (φ, τ, λ) = S (φ, λ)− λU + y.
This payoff is maximized when the deviant chooses trading probabilities φ which correspond with
the planner’s solution φ∗, and τ such that
∂
∂λ
S (φ∗, λ) ≡ d
dλ
S (λ) = U. (9)
Note that {φ0, τ0} can be part of an equilibrium if, and only if, it is a solution to the deviant’s
maximization problem, i.e., φ0 = φ∗ and λ0 solves (9). Strict concavity of S (λ) implies that a
unique solution exists to (9) for each level of market utility. Hence, all sellers must attract the same
queue length and this queue length must equal λ = Λ, as any other value is inconsistent with the
aggregate buyer-seller ratio. It is easy to verify that d
dλ
S (λ)
∣∣
λ=Λ
= U (r∗, t∗,Λ), which implies
that {φ0, τ0} is an equilibrium strategy if and only if it is pay-off equivalent to the equilibrium
characterized in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. First, we show that invariance implies a zero meeting fee (i.e., statement
2 implies statement 1). Note that P˜n (λ, γ) is a compound distribution describing the sum of
N ∼ Pn (λ) independent Bernoulli variables. The probability-generating function of a Bernoulli
20Naturally, the amount of surplus created by a seller does not depend on the payments.
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variable is 1−γ+γz, so the probability-generating function of P˜n (λ, γ) equalsm (1− γ + γz;λ) .
The invariance condition is then equivalent to
m (1− γ + γz;λ) = m (z; γλ) . (10)
Taking the derivative of this condition with respect to γ and evaluating the result in γ = 1 yields
− (1− z)mz (z;λ) = λmλ (z;λ) , (11)
for all z and λ. If we substitute this expression into (6) for z = F (x) and λ = Λ, then t∗ = 0
follows immediately.
Second, we show that a meeting technology that does not need a meeting fee for all F (x), y
and Λ must satisfy equation (7) (i.e., statement 1 implies statement 3). Note that since y affects the
lower bound of integration in (6), expression (11) is not only a sufficient condition, but it is also a
necessary condition. This expression is a first-order partial differential equation with solution
m (z;λ) = M (λ (1− z)) , (12)
for arbitrary differentiable M , although our assumptions about Pn (λ) and m (z;λ) require a num-
ber of additional restrictions on M , which we characterize in the Appendix. Equation (7) directly
follows from (12).
To complete the proof, it suffices—by the transitivity of implication—to show that a meeting
technology which satisfies equation (7) is invariant (i.e. statement 3 implies statement 2). This is
immediate using probability-generating functions, as (12) satisfies (10).
Proof of Lemma 2. The necessity of non-rivalry follows from combining equation (3) and equa-
tion (12), which reveals that invariant meeting technologies satisfy
∑∞
n=0 nPn (λ) = −M ′ (0)λ.
We establish in the online Appendix that M ′ (0) ∈ [−1, 0]. Hence, meeting technologies that are
invariant are also non-rival.
To prove that non-rivalry is not sufficient, we show that the pairwise urn-ball technology is a
counterexample. For this technology, 1−Q0 (λ) = 1 is independent of λ. Hence, pairwise urn-ball
is non-rival. At the same time, pairwise urn-ball violates invariance, because P˜1 (λ, γ) > 0 for all
γ > 0, while P1 (γλ) = 0. Hence, non-rivalry does not imply invariance.
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Free Entry
Although Proposition 2 establishes that the equilibrium is efficient for any arbitrary ratio of buy-
ers to sellers, a traditional concern in much of the search literature is whether efficiency is also
achieved when this ratio is determined endogenously. To address this issue, suppose that sellers
can freely enter the market by paying a cost k, as in standard search models (see, e.g., Pissarides,
1985). The planner will then choose the measure of sellers µS to maximize net social surplus,
max
µS∈(0,∞)
µS
[
S
(
µB
µS
)
− k
]
, (13)
while the equilibrium measure of sellers follows from the indifference condition
R
(
r∗, t∗,
µB
µS
)
− k = y. (14)
The following lemma states that the market tightness achieved in equilibrium indeed coincides
with the solution to the planner’s problem.
Lemma A1. The market equilibrium with free entry is constrained efficient.
This extends some of the results of of Albrecht et al. (2012, 2014) to arbitrary meeting tech-
nologies. Clearly, our results regarding the importance of meeting fees and (invariance of) the
meeting technology are robust to endogenizing the measure of sellers, as they hold for arbitrary
values of the buyer-seller ratio.
Proof. The proof resembles Lester et al. (2013) and Albrecht et al. (2014). The equilibrium
measure of sellers is determined by the free entry condition (14). Since S (λ) = R (r∗, t∗, λ) +
λU (r∗, t∗, λ)− y, this condition is equivalent to
S
(
µB
µS
)
− k = µB
µS
U
(
r∗, t∗,
µB
µS
)
. (15)
The efficient measure of sellers follows from the first-order condition of net social surplus, de-
scribed in (13), with respect to µS . After simplification, this yields
S
(
µB
µS
)
− k = µB
µS
S ′
(
µB
µS
)
. (16)
Since S ′
(
µB
µS
)
= U
(
r∗, t∗, µB
µS
)
, it follows that the solution to (15) solves (16). 
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Necessity of Meeting Fees
Proposition 3 establishes that all equilibria must be payoff-equivalent to the one with second-price
auctions and meeting fees. In this proposition, payoff-equivalence concerns the expected payoffs
and not the realized payoffs, as it is straightforward to change the latter while keeping the former
the same, e.g. by changing the auction format. This observation may raise the question whether
one can construct an equilibrium mechanism in which the meeting fees/subsidies are replaced by
an extra payment by/to the trading buyer, such that buyers who do not trade receive a zero payoff,
even when the meeting technology is not invariant. Lemma A2 establishes that this is not feasible.
Before presenting the formal argue, we sketch the intuition.
We know that any mechanism that is chosen in equilibrium has to implement the planner’s
solution, and it has to be payoff equivalent to the mechanism we describe. This puts a lot of
structure on the mechanism: it pins down the probability that a buyer is awarded the good, and it
pins down the expected transfer he pays. Suppose we divide the game into three stages: at stage
1, buyers choose a seller; at stage 2, buyers arrive and are potentially asked to pay a meeting fee
(or receive a subsidy); and at stage 3, buyers learn their type and report it, whereupon the good is
allocated and additional transfers occur. Our mechanism specifies that all buyers pay t at stage 2,
and then a second price auction occurs at stage 3. The question can then be phrased: is there an
alternative mechanism with no transfers at stage 2, and only a transfer between the seller and the
buyer who receives the good at stage 3?
Loosely speaking, the reason the answer is “no” is that transfers at stage 3 have to respect
both an individual rationality (or participation) constraint and an incentive compatibility (or truth-
telling) constraint. If the seller did not charge t at stage 2, he would have to charge higher prices
at stage 3; otherwise his revenue would be different, which violates payoff-equivalence. However,
he cannot raise prices on only buyers who report high valuations, as this would violate incentive
compatibility. Therefore, he would have to raise prices on all buyers, but this would violate the
participation constraint of buyers with valuations very close to y. Hence, the seller must extract
rents at stage 2; he cannot derive a pricing scheme that extracts the same rents but still respects the
buyers’ IR and IC constraints.
Lemma A2. All equilibrium mechanisms must include a transfer, (in expectation) equal to t∗,
which is paid by/to each of the buyers who arrive at a seller before they learn their valuations
Proof. As a first step, consider a mechanism {φn(x), τn(x)} that assigns a probability of trade
φn(x) in exchange for a transfer τn(x) to an agent who reports being of type x when there are
n buyers participating in the mechanism.21 Once a buyer has learned his type, x, he reports a
21This representation of a mechanism constitutes a slight abuse of notation whereby, e.g., φn(x1) =∫
. . .
∫
φ(x1, x2, . . . , xn, n)dF (x2) . . . dF (xn), where φ(x1, . . . , xn, n) is defined in the main text.
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valuation x′ which maximizes
φn (x
′)x− τn (x′) . (17)
The incentive compatibility (or truth-telling) constraint then requires
φ′n (x)x− τ ′n (x) = 0. (18)
Hence,
τn (x) =
∫ x
y
τ ′n (x˜) dx˜+ C0 =
∫ x
y
x˜dφn (x˜) + C0
= φn (x)x− yφn (y)−
∫ x
y
φn (x˜) dx˜+ C0
= φn (x)x−
∫ x
y
φn (x˜) dx˜+ C1, (19)
for constants C0 and C1, where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Combining
(17) and (19) yields ∫ x
y
φn (x˜) dx˜− C1. (20)
Hence, in any incentive compatible mechanism, the expected payoff to a buyer with valuation x is
completely determined by the probability of trade, φn(x), and a constant C1.
Next, as a second step, we will show that both the probabilities of trade and the constant C1 are
uniquely determined in any equilibrium of our game. To see this, first note that any equilibrium
mechanism must be constrained efficient (Proposition 2 in the text), which implies that the good
must be allocated to the agent who values it most. Hence,
φn(x) =
F n−1(x) if x ≥ y0 otherwise. (21)
Substituting (21) into (20) and taking expectations over n and x, we find that the ex ante expected
utility of a buyer is
U =
∞∑
n=1
Qn (λ)
[∫ x
x
∫ x
y
F n−1 (x˜) dx˜dF (x)− C1
]
. (22)
By Proposition 3, U = U¯(r∗, t∗,Λ) in any equilibrium, which implies that C1 is also uniquely
determined. Indeed, in our mechanism, C1 = t, the meeting fee.
Finally, as a last step, consider an equilibrium of our game in which C1 = t > 0. Moreover,
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suppose we decompose C1 = Ca1 +C
b
1, where C
a
1 denotes any fees that are paid before buyers learn
their type, and Cb1 are transfers made after reporting x. The individual rationality (or participation)
constraint of a buyer with valuation x is given by∫ x
y
φn (x˜) dx˜− Cb1 ≥ 0. (23)
Since this constraint must hold for all x ∈ [y, x], it follows that Cb1 = 0 in every equilibrium. 
Restrictions on M
Our assumptions about Pn (λ) and m (z;λ) impose a number of restrictions on M (·).22
(i) m being a probability-generating function requires that M is an analytic function.23
(ii) 1
n!
∂n
∂zn
m (0;λ) ∈ [0, 1] for all n and all λ requires that (−λ)n
n!
M (n) (λ) ∈ [0, 1] for all n and λ;
(iii) m (1;λ) = 1 for all λ requires that M (0) = 1;
(iv) mz (1;λ) ∈ [0, λ] for all λ requires that M ′ (0) ∈ [−1, 0];
(v) mλ (z;λ) < 0 for all z and all λ requires that M ′ (λ) < 0 for all λ;
(vi) mλλ (z;λ) > 0 for all z and all λ requires that M ′′ (λ) > 0 for all λ.
Jointly, these restrictions completely characterize the set of feasible M (·). However, a tighter
characterization is possible. For example, restriction (ii) can be tightened as follows
(ii′) M satisfies (−λ)
n
n!
M (n) (λ) ∈ (0, 1) for all n and λ.
Proof. We provide a proof by contradiction. Suppose that there exist a n̂ ∈ N0 and a λ̂ > 0 such
that (
−λ̂)n̂
n̂!
M (n̂)
(
λ̂
)
= 0. As λ̂ > 0, this impliesM (n̂)
(
λ̂
)
= 0. BecauseM (n̂) (λ) is continuously
differentiable but cannot cross zero, it must be the case that its first derivative is zero in λ = λ̂ as
well, i.e. M (n̂+1)
(
λ̂
)
= 0. By induction, it then follows that all higher derivatives must equal zero
in this point, M (n)
(
λ̂
)
= 0 for all n ∈ {n̂, n̂+ 1, n̂+ 2, . . .}.
With all of its derivatives being zero in λ̂, the analytic function M (n̂) (λ) must be zero in
a neighborhood around λ̂. Again by induction, we therefore obtain that M (n) (λ) = 0 for all
22To keep notation concise, we write “all λ” instead of “all λ ∈ (0,∞)”, “all n instead of “all n ∈ N0”, and “all z”
instead of “all z ∈ [0, 1)”.
23Probability-generating functions are analytic functions (Sachkov, 1997).
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n ∈ {n̂, n̂+ 1, n̂+ 2, . . .} and all λ. In that case,
n̂−1∑
i=0
Pi (λ) =
n̂−1∑
i=0
(−λ)i
i!
M (i) (λ) = 1,
which is a differential equation with solution M (λ) = 1 +
∑n̂−1
i=1 ciλ
i, for some coefficients
ci. Because M ′ (λ) < 0 rules out the possibility that M (λ) is a constant, one obtains that
limλ→∞ |M (λ)| = +∞.
This contradicts the requirement that M (λ) ∈ [0, 1] for all λ. Hence, it must be true that
(−λ)n
n!
M (n) (λ) > 0 for all n and all λ. This immediately implies that (−λ)
n
n!
M (n) (λ) < 1, for all n
and all λ, which completes the proof. 
Note that restriction (ii′) implies restriction (v) and (vi), which are therefore redundant. Hence,
the set of feasible M can be characterized by restrictions (i), (ii′), (iii), and (iv).
Independence
Another well-known property of the urn-ball meeting technology is that Pn (λ) does not only
represent the distribution of the total number of buyers at each seller, but also the distribution of
the number of competitors a buyer faces when arriving at a seller. In other words, a buyer who
meets with a seller has no effect on the distribution (and thus the expectation) of the number of
other buyers at the same seller. We will say that a meeting technology that satisfies this property
exhibits “independence”.
Formally, independence means Qn (λ) = (1−Q0 (λ))Pn−1 (λ) for all λ and n ∈ N1. This
property can be shown to be satisfied if and only if the meeting technology is of the following
form:24
Pn (λ) = e
−(1−Q0(λ))λ [(1−Q0 (λ))λ]n
n!
. (24)
The following lemma establishes that independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for invariance.
Lemma 3. Invariance does not imply independence and independence does not imply invariance.
To see why invariance does not imply independence, consider the geometric technology. As
we established in the main text, this meeting technology is invariant. However, this technology is
not independent, as the fact that an individual buyer meets with a seller changes the probability
24By the consistency requirement and induction, the condition implies that Pn (λ) = 1n!λ
n [1−Q0 (λ)]n P0 (λ) .
Since Pn (λ) is a probability distribution, we must have 1 =
∑∞
0
1
n!λ
n [1−Q0 (λ)]n P0 (λ) = eλ[1−Q0(λ)]P0 (λ) .
Solving the second equation for P0 (λ) and substituting the solution into the first equation yields (24). Conversely,
equation (24) implies the independence condition immediately.
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distribution over the number of other buyers who meet with the seller. In particular, when a buyer
meets with a seller, he learns that the seller has only met with buyers thus far, which increases the
expected number of other buyers that this seller will ultimately meet; that is, the conditional mean
of the queue length is greater than the unconditional mean.
Finally, to understand why independence does not imply invariance, consider the following
variation on the urn-ball technology, in which a longer queue length reduces each buyers’ chances
of meeting a seller. That is,25
Pn (λ) = e
−Φ(λ)λ [Φ (λ)λ]
n
n!
, (25)
where Φ (λ) : [0,∞) → [0, 1] satisfies Φ (0) = 1 and Φ′ (λ) < 0. To understand this meeting
technology, imagine that buyers and sellers in each sub-market begin on separate islands. The
measure σ of sellers each send a boat to transport the measure β of buyers, so that each boat
carries λ = β/σ buyers to the sellers’ island. However, each boat sinks with probability 1−Φ(λ),
so that heavier boats are more likely to sink. Then, the buyers that arrive safely at the sellers’ island
randomly select a seller, as in the urn-ball specification.
Since the probability of each boat’s safe passage depends on the ratio of buyers to sellers in
the sub-market, this technology does not satisfy the requirements of non-rivalry, and hence is not
invariant. However, once buyers arrive, the meeting process ensues according to the standard urn-
ball technology, so that the arrival of an individual buyer has no effect on the distribution of other
buyers to arrive. Hence, this meeting process satisfies independence.26
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